A potential
scenario in Iraq seems to be a loosely formed alliance or the breakup
into three states, ruled by the Kurds, the Shias, and the Sunnis.
Such a scenario would severely limit Iranian influence in the region,
and could lead to further demands of autonomy by Iranian Kurds.
Despite having rich
natural and water sources, Kurdish regions of Iran were ranked as the
least developed provinces in the country (Elling, 2013). The
government has not only underinvested in the region, but also has
squeezed the agricultural production and forbid education in Kurdish
language (Amnesty International, 2008). As a result, the
unemployment rate in the region was as high as 50% in 2008 (Iranian
Kurdistan, 2008). The mistreatment at home and inspirations of
Kurdish struggle coming from Iraq and Turkey led to formation of
Kurdish rebel group. According to PJAK, the Iranian wing of Kurdish
Political and Military Organization PKK, the hopes of attaining
self-rule through peaceful means had exhausted and there was no other
opportunity left but to take up arms (Zambelis, 2011). However, the
rebellion support in Iranian Kurdistan has not been as strong as the
local Kurdish groups received in Turkey and Iraq. One reason for the
low levels of support is the mismatch of identities between the
Kurdish leadership, most of whom are urban and left oriented, and
basic Kurdish Iranian population, most of whom are rural and loyal to
their tribes (Smith, 2009). These tribes (ashirets) are dominated by
rural elites who have kept a distance with rebel groups (Smith, 2009)
and the traditional leadership has often hindered the development of
Kurdish nationalism (Kamali, 2003). In addition, there are many
Kurdish factions in Iran, making it difficult to form a
representative group to be able to negotiate with the Islamic
Republic (Bordbar, 2014). As the Islamic Republic continued to be “an
island of stability”, Kurdish separatist factions have focused
their energies on Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, where they have had a
higher likelihood of maintaining independence. Therefore, knowing the
limits of independence movement in Iran, the reaction of the Iranian
government towards Kurdish independence movements in Syria and Iraq
has remained cautious and pragmatic. For instance, while declaring
its desire to see Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis to return back to their
alliance with Shias, Iran supplied arms to peshmerga in their fight
against IS (Collard, 2014). In addition, it supported Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan and other Kurdish groups that currently oppose
independence (Collard, 2014). Iran's pragmatism towards Kurds is
evident from its policy goals from the Kurdish Regional government,
as it wishes to keep an eye on Iranian elements and Kurds in the KRG,
ensure that KRG embraces policies that support Iran’s interests,
and ensure that leaders in Kurdistan do not form alliance with other
groups (Knights and Pollock, 2014).
Yet, while
remaining pragmatic Iran also faces serious dilemmas. One the one end
of the spectrum, there is the idea that the Kurds in Iran will not be
able to achieve the progress achieved by their kinships (Knights and
Pollock, 2014). Therefore, Iranian government can increase its
cooperation with an autonomous Kurdish region while improving the
living standards and democratic participation of its Kurdish
population. Overall, the ethnic groups with less access to political
and economic power are more likely to rebel against the government
(Cederman et al, 2010). The current income equality and land
distribution within the Kurdish regions of Iran is also receptive of
economic endowments. The land reform of 1962-1966 initiated by the
Shah took away the land from tribal leaders, distributed it among
peasants and encouraged waged agricultural labor (Kamali, 2003). This
led to a more egalitarian society. An economic initiative to the
region, such as cutting down taxes on land or providing incentives
for agricultural products could benefit the society in equal terms.
This would decrease the possibility of horizontal inequality. As
evidence shows from India, growing horizontal inequality can produce
dissidents, even if it is accompanied by economic growth (Murshed,
2013). On the other hand, the inequality of Kurdistan with other
regions of Iran coupled with the egalitarian outlook of the Kurdish
population offers a very favorable field for the growth of
nationalism. Overall, relative equality of landownership together
with overall poverty works against emergence of class cleavages among
peasants by producing a ''corporate village'' pattern (Ozbudun,
1988). The economic endowments toward region could lead to creation
of a greater middle class in this ''corporate village''. As in the
case of Singapore, this middle class could seek to have greater
autonomy from the central government, especially regarding culture in
order to take greater control of their lives (Rodan, 2007).
Overall, opening up
the Kurdish regions and cooperating with Kurdish National Government
could mean the acceleration of the nationalist movement in Kurdish
regions and more internal turmoil. On the other hand, it could lead
to a long term solution to the Kurdish problem and deeper integration
of Kurdish population to the society. In such case, Iran's portfolio
over divided Iraq would be greatly diversified, and Iran would exert
much more independent foreign policy.
For American
interests, the presence of a secular, stable, democratic, and
pro-American Kurdish state would be desirable. Yet, transition to
such a stage could entail an internal turmoil in Iran. The previous
attempts by reformists to create a more inclusive Iran have faced
resistance by conservatives. During the reformist Khatami's term,
Kurdish politicians were rejected from ruling for the office (Romano
and Gurses, 2014). City council meetings in the Kurdish region were
occasionally nullified by the conservatives
(Romano and Gurses, 2014). As evidenced, attempts for reforms could
receive serious resistance from the military and ruling machine, who
would prefer the status quo and even turmoil over a more democratic
and open society, as openness could mean the deregulation of their
political and military power. As we can recall from the Iran-Iraq
War, the ruling elite of Iran is notorious for utilizing existing
threats to its national security in order to silence the opposition.
Overall, it is ambiguous to figure out what effect a more powerful
Iran have on the Kurdish issue. As long the ruling elite stays in
power the tilt will be in favor of oppression and a desire to keep
the status quo, even though this could mean a greater internal
turmoil.
yasunsalih@sabanciuniv.edu
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