The Potential of a New Alliance in Turkish Politics

  The AKP has been successful in maintaining power by forming an informal alliance of liberals, conservatives, even social democrats and Ataturkists. According to a poll conducted by Metropoll in September and October 2013, 10.4% of AKP base consisted of those who identified themselves as democrats and liberals, and 5.8% social democrats.

   The informal alliance has been supported through the 10% national education threshold, which requires political parties to earn at least 10% of the popular vote to be represented in the parliament. As the AKP became the power house, right wing and liberal parties, such as Democrat Party, Has Party and Motherland Party disappeared from the political scene as they remained out of parliament with disappointing results. The disappearance was not felt much, until a power vacuum arose in the opposition.

   The excessive police force directed by Erdogan during the Gezi protests irritated liberal and social democrat voices among AKP. The case for the closure of prep schools, which are the main financial base for the Gulen movement, alienated the Gulenist base. Erdogan put pressure on judiciary and police to halt the investigation of the 17th December corruption case, which disturbed the separation of powers, further deepening the rifts within nearly all parts of the alliance. The language employed by Erdogan has become harsher and more intolerant, appealing to only a certain proportion of his base. Over the past month, four MPs have resigned from AKP, and three more are expected to resign.

   As the rifts deepen, the question becomes whether the political vacuum within the AKP can be filled by the formation of another party.  If we assume that all the democrats, liberals, and social democrats within AKP would support a new party, it would earn 8.1% of the total vote (based on Metropoll data).  If we add into the picture Gulenists and Ataturkists within AKP, the new party could reach a comfortable 15%, becoming a serious alternative to AKP. Yet several isssues discourage the formation of a new party, such as funding, difficulty to organize a political base around the nation, and uncertainty in Turkish politics. In 2007, right before the election, we observed the collapse of a coalition of liberals and democrats (Motherland and True Path Party), due to power politics. The fear of another collapse might be deterring different voices from coming together.

   10% threshold requires the establishment of a wide coalition, which is risky in its nature and is creating a power vacuum among the alternatives of AKP. If a new formed alliance party can pass the 10% threshold, we may see a coalition in the parliament in opposition of AKP. If the new formed party fails short of 10%, AKP might manage hold in power, but this time losing its pluralism and remaining with even more isolationist and pragmatic approaches.

   Therefore, the fate of 2015 elections might depend on whether a new alliance could pass the 10% threshold.

   Salih Yasun
   Cleveland State University
   Undergradaute Student