Iran's Kurdish Dilemma

      A potential scenario in Iraq seems to be a loosely formed alliance or the breakup into three states, ruled by the Kurds, the Shias, and the Sunnis. Such a scenario would severely limit Iranian influence in the region, and could lead to further demands of autonomy by Iranian Kurds.

         Despite having rich natural and water sources, Kurdish regions of Iran were ranked as the least developed provinces in the country (Elling, 2013). The government has not only underinvested in the region, but also has squeezed the agricultural production and forbid education in Kurdish language (Amnesty International, 2008). As a result, the unemployment rate in the region was as high as 50% in 2008 (Iranian Kurdistan, 2008). The mistreatment at home and inspirations of Kurdish struggle coming from Iraq and Turkey led to formation of Kurdish rebel group. According to PJAK, the Iranian wing of Kurdish Political and Military Organization PKK, the hopes of attaining self-rule through peaceful means had exhausted and there was no other opportunity left but to take up arms (Zambelis, 2011). However, the rebellion support in Iranian Kurdistan has not been as strong as the local Kurdish groups received in Turkey and Iraq. One reason for the low levels of support is the mismatch of identities between the Kurdish leadership, most of whom are urban and left oriented, and basic Kurdish Iranian population, most of whom are rural and loyal to their tribes (Smith, 2009). These tribes (ashirets) are dominated by rural elites who have kept a distance with rebel groups (Smith, 2009) and the traditional leadership has often hindered the development of Kurdish nationalism (Kamali, 2003). In addition, there are many Kurdish factions in Iran, making it difficult to form a representative group to be able to negotiate with the Islamic Republic (Bordbar, 2014). As the Islamic Republic continued to be “an island of stability”, Kurdish separatist factions have focused their energies on Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, where they have had a higher likelihood of maintaining independence. Therefore, knowing the limits of independence movement in Iran, the reaction of the Iranian government towards Kurdish independence movements in Syria and Iraq has remained cautious and pragmatic. For instance, while declaring its desire to see Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis to return back to their alliance with Shias, Iran supplied arms to peshmerga in their fight against IS (Collard, 2014). In addition, it supported Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and other Kurdish groups that currently oppose independence (Collard, 2014). Iran's pragmatism towards Kurds is evident from its policy goals from the Kurdish Regional government, as it wishes to keep an eye on Iranian elements and Kurds in the KRG, ensure that KRG embraces policies that support Iran’s interests, and ensure that leaders in Kurdistan do not form alliance with other groups (Knights and Pollock, 2014).

           

             Yet, while remaining pragmatic Iran also faces serious dilemmas. One the one end of the spectrum, there is the idea that the Kurds in Iran will not be able to achieve the progress achieved by their kinships (Knights and Pollock, 2014). Therefore, Iranian government can increase its cooperation with an autonomous Kurdish region while improving the living standards and democratic participation of its Kurdish population. Overall, the ethnic groups with less access to political and economic power are more likely to rebel against the government (Cederman et al, 2010). The current income equality and land distribution within the Kurdish regions of Iran is also receptive of economic endowments. The land reform of 1962-1966 initiated by the Shah took away the land from tribal leaders, distributed it among peasants and encouraged waged agricultural labor (Kamali, 2003). This led to a more egalitarian society. An economic initiative to the region, such as cutting down taxes on land or providing incentives for agricultural products could benefit the society in equal terms. This would decrease the possibility of horizontal inequality. As evidence shows from India, growing horizontal inequality can produce dissidents, even if it is accompanied by economic growth (Murshed, 2013). On the other hand, the inequality of Kurdistan with other regions of Iran coupled with the egalitarian outlook of the Kurdish population offers a very favorable field for the growth of nationalism. Overall, relative equality of landownership together with overall poverty works against emergence of class cleavages among peasants by producing a ''corporate village'' pattern (Ozbudun, 1988). The economic endowments toward region could lead to creation of a greater middle class in this ''corporate village''. As in the case of Singapore, this middle class could seek to have greater autonomy from the central government, especially regarding culture in order to take greater control of their lives (Rodan, 2007).

          Overall, opening up the Kurdish regions and cooperating with Kurdish National Government could mean the acceleration of the nationalist movement in Kurdish regions and more internal turmoil. On the other hand, it could lead to a long term solution to the Kurdish problem and deeper integration of Kurdish population to the society. In such case, Iran's portfolio over divided Iraq would be greatly diversified, and Iran would exert much more independent foreign policy.

For American interests, the presence of a secular, stable, democratic, and pro-American Kurdish state would be desirable. Yet, transition to such a stage could entail an internal turmoil in Iran. The previous attempts by reformists to create a more inclusive Iran have faced resistance by conservatives. During the reformist Khatami's term, Kurdish politicians were rejected from ruling for the office (Romano and Gurses, 2014). City council meetings in the Kurdish region were occasionally nullified by the conservatives (Romano and Gurses, 2014). As evidenced, attempts for reforms could receive serious resistance from the military and ruling machine, who would prefer the status quo and even turmoil over a more democratic and open society, as openness could mean the deregulation of their political and military power. As we can recall from the Iran-Iraq War, the ruling elite of Iran is notorious for utilizing existing threats to its national security in order to silence the opposition. Overall, it is ambiguous to figure out what effect a more powerful Iran have on the Kurdish issue. As long the ruling elite stays in power the tilt will be in favor of oppression and a desire to keep the status quo, even though this could mean a greater internal turmoil.

yasunsalih@sabanciuniv.edu

Sources

Elling, Christian R. Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. print.

"Iran: Human Rights Abuses Against the Kurdish Minority." Amnesty International | Working to Protect Human Rights. 2008. Web. 14 Sep. 2014.

Iranian Kurdistan. Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizaiton (UNPO). March 25,2008.Retrieved September 14, 2014.

Zambelis, Chris. The Factors Behind Rebellion in Iranian Kurdistan. West Point: Combatting Terrorism Center, 2011. Web. 10 May. 2014

Smith, Benjamin. "Kurdish Separatism in Comparative Perspective”:1-33. 2009. Web. 14 Sept. 2014.

Kamali, Farideh. (2003). The political development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral nationalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bordbar, Behdad. "Iranian Kurds Disappointed with Rouhani." Al Monitor 23 12 2013, Web. 14 Sept. 2014.

Collard, Rebecca. "The Enemy of My Enemy: Iran Arms Kurds in Fight against ISIS." Time Magazine 27 08 2014, Web. 9 Sept. 2014.

Knights, Michael, and Pollock, David. "The Kurdish Crescent: New Trends in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran." Washington Institute for Near East Policy 14 09 2014, Web. 14 Sep. 2014.

Cederman, L., Wimmer, A., & Min, B. (2010). Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data And Analysis.World Politics.

Murshed, S. (2013). The role of inequality in rebellion and revolt. The Brooker. Retrieved September 25, 2014.

Ozbudun, Ergun. ''Development of Democratic Government in Turkey,'' in Ergun Ozbudun (ed.), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey. 1988, Web. 25 Sep 2014.

Rodan, G. (2007). Singapoure: Emerging Tensions in the Dictatorship of Middle Class.The Pacific Review,5(4), 370-381.

Making Sense of IS's Violence: Is Its Ideology the Cause?

      The classic argument in the study of civil wars is that ideological tendencies of movements account for their character and actions.  As a result, in the Western world a wide assumption has been established that violence against civilians is one of the fundamental characteristics of Islam.  Terrorist organizations in the Middle East have often been called “Islamists, jihadists, Muslim groups.”

     Rejecting or accepting such assumptions require a throughout study of Islam.  The goal of this article is not to investigate the so called link between Islam and violence, for that purpose there is a large literature in the field. Instead, I would like to talk about the theory of endowments, which argues that it could be the factors other than ideology (religious, political etc) that may encourage violence against civilians.

  Recently I read a book called “Inside Rebellion”, written by Jeremy Weinstein. Weinstein argued that the ideology of rebel organizations is not a determinant factor in the conduct of violence. Instead, we need to look into social and economic endowments of rebel organizations. The rebel organizations with high levels of economic endowments are associated with high levels of indiscriminate violence, as leaders are unable to use their wealth in support of their groups’ social purposes.

    Weinstein separates recruits of rebel organizations in two groups.  The first group is composed of high-commitment recruits (investors) , who are dedicated to the cause of the organization and willing to make costly investments today for the rewards in the future. The second group is composed of low-commitment individuals (consumers), who are seeking short-term material gains. Consumers are tied to rebel organizations usually for material gains. They are less productive, as they require a continual expenditure of resources in the short term. 

    In the long run, resource-rich rebel groups tend to be filled by opportunistic joiners, while those fighting with little economic endowments attract committed soldiers. Because they are held together by short-term material incentives, resource-rich rebel groups should provide material support to their combatants to prevent their collapse. These groups are therefore permissive of attacks on civilian populations to maintain their membership.

    In addition, the groups that are built on economic endowments do not need civilian support to survive; therefore they behave in a more predatory fashion, with no concerns about the reactions of the populations. The same holds true for obtaining resources. Where they are provided externally or require minimal labor, groups have few reasons to ensure broad-based participation of population.

The Case of IS

 IS made considerable money through war itself, plundering millions of dollars from local Christians and Shiites, whom they viewed as “apostates” (Johnston, Bahney). They kidnapped foreigners for ransom, as it was noted that they asked for about 132$m dollars for the release of American journalist James Foley (Rukmini).  There were reports that ISIS stole 429$m dollars from financial institutions when they raided Mosul (Jack More). IS is engaged in oil industry, which helps to build up a surplus of $100m to $200m dollars of revenues (Johnston, Bahney). With all the revenue that is generated, ISIS provides salaries that are higher than those of governmental forces (Shelton, Tracey). As a result, ISIS is largely composed of low-commitment opportunistic  fighters. The short-term, material motivations of its membership rendered ISIS’s commanders unable to police defection or indiscipline within their units, abusiveness was an unintended result of a recruitment strategy that attracted opportunistic joiners first. In addition, IS does not need the broad population’s support or hard labor for its survival, therefore IS commanders do not have much incentive to prevent the application of indiscriminate violence.

   Applying Weinstein’s theory into the case of IS violence shows us that we may not be able to find the causes of civilian violence by solely looking into IS’s ideology.

Sources

Johnston, Patrick, and Benjamin Bahney. "Disrupt ISIS's Cash Flows." The New York Times13 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.

Shelton, Tracey. "No More Mr. Nice Islamic State." CNBC 19 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.
       

Rukmini, Callimachi. "Before Killing James Foley, ISIS Demanded Ransom From U.S." The New York Times 20 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007. Print.

Was Immobilization of CHP Strongholds a Determinant Factor in 2014 Presidential Elections?

  At the 2014 Turkish Presidential Elections, The AKP’s candidate Prime Minister Erdogan (%51) decisively beat the CHP-MHP’s joint presidential candidate Ihsanoglu (%39). Following the results, many political columnists blamed CHP for failing to mobilize its supporters to go to ballot boxes.

  I wanted to statistically test these claims. First, I identified the strongholds of AKP and CHP through finding out the top ten cities that the respective parties received the highest support in 2014 local elections (general assembly results).

AKP’s cities were:

Rize

Konya

Malatya

Bingol

Kayseri

Bayburt

Cankiri

Duzce

Sakarya

Gumushane

CHP’s cities were:

Izmir

Mugla

Aydin

Canakkale

Tekirdag

Edirne

Kirklareli

Eskisehir

Istanbul

Hatay

Then, I compared the total participation rate of the electorate in these cities from 2014 local elections to 2014 presidential elections. 

AKP’s strongholds:

Cities	Total Participation in Presidential Elections	Total Participation in Local Elections	Difference (Local-Presidential)
Rize	0.77	0.84	0.08
Konya	0.81	0.90	0.09
Malatya	0.78	0.94	0.16
Bingol	0.75	0.84	0.09
Kayseri	0.82	0.91	0.09
Bayburt	0.79	0.83	0.04
Cankiri	0.78	0.92	0.14
Duzce	0.82	0.89	0.08
Sakarya	0.81	0.91	0.10
Gumushane	0.72	0.89	0.17

CHP’s strongholds:

Cities	Total Participation in Presidential Elections	Total Participation in Local Elections	Difference (Local-Presidential)
Izmir	0.76	0.9076	0.14
Mugla	0.78	0.9092	0.13
Aydin	0.78	0.9091	0.12
Canakkale	0.84	0.8918	0.05
Tekirdag	0.80	0.9024	0.11
Edirne	0.81	0.892	0.08
Kirklareli	0.82	0.9007	0.08
Eskisehir	0.80	0.9048	0.11
Istanbul	0.66	0.9066	0.25
Hatay	0.81	0.8922	0.08

I applied a Two Sample T test to figure out if there is any statistical difference between the participation difference of AKP’s strongholds and participation difference of CHP’s strongholds.

Two-sample T for DIFFAKP vs DIFFCHP

          N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean

DIFFAKP  10  0.1044  0.0408    0.013

DIFFCHP  10  0.1153  0.0542    0.017

Difference = mu (DIFFAKP) - mu (DIFFCHP)

Estimate for difference:  -0.0109

95% CI for difference:  (-0.0560, 0.0341)

T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.51  P-Value = 0.617  DF = 18

Both use Pooled StDev = 0.0480

At 95% confidence level, there is no significant difference (p=.617) between the groups. Therefore, we can’t statistically claim that the difference of participation rate between local elections and presidential elections in CHP’s strongholds was statistically different than the difference of participation rate in AKP’s strongholds. 

Sources:

2014 Local Election Results - www.hurriyet.com.tr

2014 Presidential Unofficial Results – www.cumhuriyet.com.tr

Salih Yasun 

yasunsalih@gmail.com

Micro Targeting: The Point That CHP missed in 2014 elections

    

Micro Targeting: The Point That CHP missed in 2014 elections

         For months leading to March 2014 local elections, CHP Istanbul mayoral candidate Mustafa Sarigul built his election campaign on governing Istanbul without making anyone feel “other”. He was implying that he would advocate for the rights of people who did not vote for him, and therefore targeting a certain portion of electorate based on party affiliation.  

          It was just five days before the election when Sarigul announced that all students would utilize public transportation for free, and public transportation would be 50% off for everyone during night hours. The promise mainly targeted low income electorate, most of whom voted for AKP in the previous elections. Yet, five days probably was not long enough for the promises to be even heard by the targeted audience.

          It was clear that CHP treated 2014 local elections as a general election. CHP’s main electorate strategy was to reach swing votes through ideological and party lines. Ideologically, the swing pool that CHP considered included liberals, democrats, and nationalists. CHP reached this line by nominating “imported candidates” from right who could find audience from CHP’s traditional base, and from the swing pool. In party lines, the swing pool included AKP, MHP and undecided voters. CHP worked on party lines by assuring AKP voters that they would not be excluded from services, and encouraging other voters to form alliance among CHP lines.

      The pooling strategy has largely failed, because CHP put too much emphasis on party and ideological lines of the electorate, while these lines were only supposed to form a part of the baseline factors to be considered. As a result, CHP failed to understand the real voting behavior of the electorate.

        CHP needs to build its electorate strategy based on micro targeting, which would cut across traditional categories and assess each member of the electorate in its own term. Basically, micro targeting gathers data about voters from a very large spectrum, including but not limited to demographics, party affiliations, goods purchased, TV programs watched and newspapers read. Than it forms an algorithm, which scores voters based on their own terms. Using the categorization, the election campaign directs its supports and messages towards the right voters.

        A reasonable and simple algorithm could be something like this:

       Voter score = .4*Party and ideological lines + .3*Demographics + .1*Goods purchased per household + .1*Type or newspaper read (supports AKP, opposes AKP, or neutral) + .1*Type of TV programs watched

        With such an algorithm CHP could determine specific electorate groups to target. For instance, there is a woman whose name is Fatma, who is a high school graduate, resides in a middle income area, watches soup operas, has three kids who are going to school and voted for the AKP in the previous elections. Fatma is not likely to be in the labor force and is likely to be worried about her children’s expenses. Campaign strategy towards her should focus on vouchers such as free bus passes that would be advertised through months leading to elections.

     When CHP does not utilize micro targeting and builds most of its electorate campaign on party and ideological lines, its assumed algorithm looks something like this:

      Voter score= .7*Party and ideological lines + .3*Others

      Such an algorithm definitely misses many things, including Fatma’s worries about her children, family income and effectiveness of airing a commercial during 11AM soup opera sessions. As a result, CHP experiences heavy problems with understanding and communicating with the electorate. As CHP leader Kilicdaroglu puts it “They (part of AKP base) do not even listen to us”.  However, it can be the lack of variables in CHP’s assumed algorithm that is assigning people like Fatma heavily on AKP side, which rules out the probability that she can be a swing voter and which fails to find the right strategies to communicate with her.

       The way out of this dead-end is not by moving towards right, but by better understanding and responding to electorate’s demands. CHP’s first post-election strategy must be examining the results box by box according to voter characteristics. Second, CHP needs to utilize micro targeting strategies to understand and communicate with the electorate. CHP needs to rediscover its biggest strengths, which are its social democratic policy approaches that can find large audiences, and that can be tailored specifically to electorate's needs.

Salih Yasun

Cleveland State University Undergraduate Student

yasunsalih@gmail.com

Traineeship in European Commission-Is there a Preference Towards EU Applicants?

 European Commission, hires trainees each year all around the world to assist in their offices at Luxembourg and Brussels.

At https://ec.europa.eu/stages/online/cv/application_statistics.cfm?session=81, they publish the statistics of number of applications and trainees.

In October 2013, 18707 applications were submitted, and 684 of them were accepted (3.65%). Among those were 1818 Non-EU applicants, of which 32 were accepted (1.76%).

A Z test can reveal whether if it is statistically significant that selection committee prefers EU citizens over non-EU citizens. The results of the test show that:

Test and CI for Two Proportions

Sample    X      N  Sample p
1        32   1818  0.017602
2       652  16889  0.038605

Difference = p (1) - p (2)
Estimate for difference:  -0.0210032
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0277100, -0.0142965)
Test for difference = 0 (vs not = 0):  Z = -4.53  P-Value = 0.000

Fisher's exact test: P-Value = 0.000


The results conclude that at 95% confidence level, there is overwhelming evidence (p=0.00) to conclude that the selection rate of EU applicants are higher than non EU applicants. The question is whether if this preference is skill based, or if there is positive discrimination towards EU applicants. If there is positive discrimination, it is Commission's responsibility to
mention this in the application process.

Salih Yasun
Cleveland State University

Political Scenarios for South Asia’s Future upon US Withdrawal

   

     The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with the closure of U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan greatly reduces American influence over Central and South Asia. Therefore the members of the region that benefited from American alliance will have to form further alliances to reach their common goals, such as containing the Taliban and jihadists, and stopping drug trafficking.

     

     Yet the issue of containing the Taliban is not so clear for the most important actor in the region: Pakistan. Before the US involvement, Pakistan was the dominant power in Afghanistan, and used its neighbor as a means to reach its most important foreign policy goal, elimination of India from Kashmir.  Having close ties with Pashtun Taliban, Pakistan used Afghanistan to recruit militia and considered Afghanistan a potential point of retreat during an Indian invasion. As the American invasion toppled the Taliban, Pakistan’s influence in the region has been greatly reduced.

     

     In Afghanistan, the attempts to establish a functioning democracy and a strong central government have failed.  The weak parliament was unable to check the president and his cabinet. The strong presence of the Taliban and war lords limited the central government’s ability to control the nation, making the nation politically unstable. The clashes between competing groups along ethnic and ideological fractures test the country’s cohesiveness. The new government, consisting of mostly non-Pashtun, cooperated with India on many infrastructure projects resulting in increases in Indian soft power. The fear of being encircled by India led Pakistan to support the Taliban in its fight against the Afghan central government even to the extent of jeopardizing American support.

     

     In the post American Afghanistan, the limit of Taliban power will determine the structure of the Afghan government and regional order. Some fears exist that the US withdrawal will result in a total collapse of the Afghan nation. Some vocals of this argument point to the inaction of the world community towards the Syrian governmental collapse as evidence that no nation will bear the costs that might be necessary to help the Afghanistan government to survive. These fears have gained ground as Afghan president Karzai opted for the next Afghan president to sign the pact that would ensure a unit of US troops in Afghanistan, jeopardizing American presence beyond 2014.

   

     In the Syrian case, certain powers, such as Iran, Russia, and China gain strategically from keeping Assad in power despite its meaning the virtual collapse of the country. In the case of Afghanistan, almost all regional and global actors would be greatly harmed by the nation’s collapse. Therefore, even in the absence of American troops, international support for the Afghan government would prevent it from collapsing. In addition, even though Taliban elements want to establish their own rule over Afghanistan, they know that the more active they are, the greater the probability that they will draw more attention and therefore retribution. Therefore, a sudden collapse of the existing Afghan state would not be on the interest of any party, including the Taliban.

   

    One potential scenario for a post 2014 Afghanistan is a continuous fight between the government and the Taliban. The Afghan population, already tired of instability and corruption, would now face an insecure future with much less American presence. The Taliban would convince the population that it succeeded in driving the United States out of Afghanistan; therefore it is powerful to bring security, stability and rule of law. The Taliban would intensify its fight against the central government. The region would face chaos and political instability.

    

    As instability increases, already insufficient inspection over opium growth and border security would dwindle. Therefore, all the neighbors would suffer from increased drug trafficking. The conflict in Afghanistan could spread to neighboring former USSR nations through terrorist organizations. Those countries are vulnerable to a domino effect, as they do not have the economic or military power to prevent the spread of revolutionary-jihadist contagion or manage spillovers of a failed neighbor. The threat would alarm Russia and deepen its involvement in the region. Though Iran has provided limited support to Taliban in order to curb American power in Afghanistan and in the region, the protection of the Shia community and its own border security interests would force to ramp up its involvement against Taliban. China would face the risk of losing out its investments in Afghanistan and the potential of jihadist involvement in Shinjang area. Conflict in Pakistan would be inevitable as many terrorist organizations operate from bases in the country. While contributing to the fight against India, some of these organizations have attacked Pakistani government as well. ISI (Pakistan Secret Service) already declared that home grown Islamic militants are bigger threat to the integrity of the region than India. In addition, due to the presence of terrorist organizations, Pakistan received drone attacks from the United States, and as the US withdraws from Afghanistan, American reliance on Pakistan will decline and the American threats on alliance with Taliban will become even more assertive. Therefore, Pakistan would be harmed by a Taliban exercising power beyond the level of stability. Overall, all the powers in the region have a self interest in containing the power of the Taliban.

  

     Another potential scenario after the withdrawal of American troops is the establishment of a power sharing government in Afghanistan between central government, the Taliban, and war lords. Such a situation is suitable for the internal dimensions of Afghanistan, as geopolitical and ethnic divisions have historically curbed the power of the central government, resulting in a large degree of independence in the local governments. According to a power sharing deal, the central government would remain weak; the Taliban and war lords would be free to exercise power over their own regional domains. As a consequence, Pakistan, assured by the presence of the Taliban, would be less worried of an Indian encirclement and therefore reduce its reflexive support to Taliban in order to focus on its internal security. With less jihadist presence in Kashmir, the Pakistani foreign policy would become more independent over India. The presence of the Taliban in a stable Afghanistan would be welcomed even by its rival India, which has taken important steps to normalize its ties with Pakistan. India’s security would be better enhanced by a certain presence of Taliban in a stable Afghanistan and therefore a less antagonistic Pakistan and less jihadist movement towards Kashmir rather than having more power in an instable Afghanistan. Energized by the eased sanctions and withdrawal of the US troops from the region, Iran would be more likely to expand its soft power in Afghanistan and increase its economic, social and political support to the central government. In addition, Iran would benefit from a stable Afghanistan through the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Iran, improved linkage with Central Asian governments, expanding assistance in combatting drug trafficking, and protection of Shia minority, as it considers itself the guardian of Shia. China would also benefit in this scenario from improved border security, increased soft power and investment opportunities. In order to ensure stability and prove its leadership, China could use its leverage on the Asian Development Bank and private sector to contribute to the economic development.

    

   However, a scenario with a stable but weak central government could have disadvantages as well. The Afghan central government would have limited ability to control drug trafficking and terrorist organizations may grow stronger as there would be little to limit them. The jihadist conflict might exacerbate along the border with the former Soviet states. Yet, the problems of a weak central government can be solved relatively easily compared to problems with instability. Russia could increase its aid to former USSR nations to stop the penetration of jihadists and halt the spread of drugs. Iran and China could tighten their border securities. Pakistan and India could work on a settlement over Kashmir, which would reduce the jihadist intake. Overall, a stable Afghanistan with a power-sharing arrangement between the Taliban, the central government, and war lords makes the challenges of the region more manageable. Therefore, the equilibrium will move towards that direction.

Salih Yasun

Cleveland State University

Undergraduate Student

yasunsalih@gmail.com