Wednesday, January 15, 2014

Political Scenarios for South Asia’s Future upon US Withdrawal

   

     The US withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with the closure of U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan greatly reduces American influence over Central and South Asia. Therefore the members of the region that benefited from American alliance will have to form further alliances to reach their common goals, such as containing the Taliban and jihadists, and stopping drug trafficking.
     
     Yet the issue of containing the Taliban is not so clear for the most important actor in the region: Pakistan. Before the US involvement, Pakistan was the dominant power in Afghanistan, and used its neighbor as a means to reach its most important foreign policy goal, elimination of India from Kashmir.  Having close ties with Pashtun Taliban, Pakistan used Afghanistan to recruit militia and considered Afghanistan a potential point of retreat during an Indian invasion. As the American invasion toppled the Taliban, Pakistan’s influence in the region has been greatly reduced.
     
     In Afghanistan, the attempts to establish a functioning democracy and a strong central government have failed.  The weak parliament was unable to check the president and his cabinet. The strong presence of the Taliban and war lords limited the central government’s ability to control the nation, making the nation politically unstable. The clashes between competing groups along ethnic and ideological fractures test the country’s cohesiveness. The new government, consisting of mostly non-Pashtun, cooperated with India on many infrastructure projects resulting in increases in Indian soft power. The fear of being encircled by India led Pakistan to support the Taliban in its fight against the Afghan central government even to the extent of jeopardizing American support.
     
     In the post American Afghanistan, the limit of Taliban power will determine the structure of the Afghan government and regional order. Some fears exist that the US withdrawal will result in a total collapse of the Afghan nation. Some vocals of this argument point to the inaction of the world community towards the Syrian governmental collapse as evidence that no nation will bear the costs that might be necessary to help the Afghanistan government to survive. These fears have gained ground as Afghan president Karzai opted for the next Afghan president to sign the pact that would ensure a unit of US troops in Afghanistan, jeopardizing American presence beyond 2014.
   
     In the Syrian case, certain powers, such as Iran, Russia, and China gain strategically from keeping Assad in power despite its meaning the virtual collapse of the country. In the case of Afghanistan, almost all regional and global actors would be greatly harmed by the nation’s collapse. Therefore, even in the absence of American troops, international support for the Afghan government would prevent it from collapsing. In addition, even though Taliban elements want to establish their own rule over Afghanistan, they know that the more active they are, the greater the probability that they will draw more attention and therefore retribution. Therefore, a sudden collapse of the existing Afghan state would not be on the interest of any party, including the Taliban.
   
    One potential scenario for a post 2014 Afghanistan is a continuous fight between the government and the Taliban. The Afghan population, already tired of instability and corruption, would now face an insecure future with much less American presence. The Taliban would convince the population that it succeeded in driving the United States out of Afghanistan; therefore it is powerful to bring security, stability and rule of law. The Taliban would intensify its fight against the central government. The region would face chaos and political instability.
    
    As instability increases, already insufficient inspection over opium growth and border security would dwindle. Therefore, all the neighbors would suffer from increased drug trafficking. The conflict in Afghanistan could spread to neighboring former USSR nations through terrorist organizations. Those countries are vulnerable to a domino effect, as they do not have the economic or military power to prevent the spread of revolutionary-jihadist contagion or manage spillovers of a failed neighbor. The threat would alarm Russia and deepen its involvement in the region. Though Iran has provided limited support to Taliban in order to curb American power in Afghanistan and in the region, the protection of the Shia community and its own border security interests would force to ramp up its involvement against Taliban. China would face the risk of losing out its investments in Afghanistan and the potential of jihadist involvement in Shinjang area. Conflict in Pakistan would be inevitable as many terrorist organizations operate from bases in the country. While contributing to the fight against India, some of these organizations have attacked Pakistani government as well. ISI (Pakistan Secret Service) already declared that home grown Islamic militants are bigger threat to the integrity of the region than India. In addition, due to the presence of terrorist organizations, Pakistan received drone attacks from the United States, and as the US withdraws from Afghanistan, American reliance on Pakistan will decline and the American threats on alliance with Taliban will become even more assertive. Therefore, Pakistan would be harmed by a Taliban exercising power beyond the level of stability. Overall, all the powers in the region have a self interest in containing the power of the Taliban.
  
     Another potential scenario after the withdrawal of American troops is the establishment of a power sharing government in Afghanistan between central government, the Taliban, and war lords. Such a situation is suitable for the internal dimensions of Afghanistan, as geopolitical and ethnic divisions have historically curbed the power of the central government, resulting in a large degree of independence in the local governments. According to a power sharing deal, the central government would remain weak; the Taliban and war lords would be free to exercise power over their own regional domains. As a consequence, Pakistan, assured by the presence of the Taliban, would be less worried of an Indian encirclement and therefore reduce its reflexive support to Taliban in order to focus on its internal security. With less jihadist presence in Kashmir, the Pakistani foreign policy would become more independent over India. The presence of the Taliban in a stable Afghanistan would be welcomed even by its rival India, which has taken important steps to normalize its ties with Pakistan. India’s security would be better enhanced by a certain presence of Taliban in a stable Afghanistan and therefore a less antagonistic Pakistan and less jihadist movement towards Kashmir rather than having more power in an instable Afghanistan. Energized by the eased sanctions and withdrawal of the US troops from the region, Iran would be more likely to expand its soft power in Afghanistan and increase its economic, social and political support to the central government. In addition, Iran would benefit from a stable Afghanistan through the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Iran, improved linkage with Central Asian governments, expanding assistance in combatting drug trafficking, and protection of Shia minority, as it considers itself the guardian of Shia. China would also benefit in this scenario from improved border security, increased soft power and investment opportunities. In order to ensure stability and prove its leadership, China could use its leverage on the Asian Development Bank and private sector to contribute to the economic development.

    
   However, a scenario with a stable but weak central government could have disadvantages as well. The Afghan central government would have limited ability to control drug trafficking and terrorist organizations may grow stronger as there would be little to limit them. The jihadist conflict might exacerbate along the border with the former Soviet states. Yet, the problems of a weak central government can be solved relatively easily compared to problems with instability. Russia could increase its aid to former USSR nations to stop the penetration of jihadists and halt the spread of drugs. Iran and China could tighten their border securities. Pakistan and India could work on a settlement over Kashmir, which would reduce the jihadist intake. Overall, a stable Afghanistan with a power-sharing arrangement between the Taliban, the central government, and war lords makes the challenges of the region more manageable. Therefore, the equilibrium will move towards that direction.

Salih Yasun
Cleveland State University
Undergraduate Student
yasunsalih@gmail.com