The classic argument in the study of civil
wars is that ideological tendencies of movements account for their character and
actions. As a result, in the Western
world a wide assumption has been established that violence against civilians is
one of the fundamental characteristics of Islam. Terrorist organizations in the Middle East
have often been called “Islamists, jihadists, Muslim groups.”
Rejecting or accepting such assumptions
require a throughout study of Islam. The
goal of this article is not to investigate the so called link between Islam and
violence, for that purpose there is a large literature in the field. Instead, I
would like to talk about the theory of endowments, which argues that it could
be the factors other than ideology (religious, political etc) that may
encourage violence against civilians.
Recently I read a book
called “Inside Rebellion”, written by Jeremy Weinstein. Weinstein argued that the
ideology of rebel organizations is not a determinant factor in the conduct of
violence. Instead, we need to look into social and economic endowments of rebel
organizations. The rebel organizations with high levels of economic endowments
are associated with high levels of indiscriminate violence, as leaders are
unable to use their wealth in support of their groups’ social purposes.
Weinstein separates recruits of rebel
organizations in two groups. The first
group is composed of high-commitment recruits (investors) , who are dedicated to the cause of the organization and
willing to make costly investments today for the rewards in the future. The
second group is composed of low-commitment individuals (consumers), who are seeking short-term material gains. Consumers
are tied to rebel organizations usually for material gains. They are less
productive, as they require a continual expenditure of resources in the short
term.
In the long run, resource-rich
rebel groups tend to be filled by opportunistic joiners, while those fighting
with little economic endowments attract committed soldiers. Because they are
held together by short-term material incentives, resource-rich rebel groups should
provide material support to their combatants to prevent their collapse. These
groups are therefore permissive of attacks on civilian populations to maintain
their membership.
In addition, the
groups that are built on economic endowments do not need civilian support to survive;
therefore they behave in a more predatory fashion, with no concerns about the
reactions of the populations. The same holds true for obtaining resources.
Where they are provided externally or require minimal labor, groups have few
reasons to ensure broad-based participation of population.
The Case of IS
IS made considerable
money through war itself, plundering millions of dollars from local Christians
and Shiites, whom they viewed as “apostates” (Johnston, Bahney). They kidnapped
foreigners for ransom, as it was noted that they asked for about 132$m dollars
for the release of American journalist James Foley (Rukmini). There were reports that ISIS stole 429$m
dollars from financial institutions when they raided Mosul (Jack More). IS is engaged in oil industry, which helps to
build up a surplus of $100m to $200m dollars of revenues (Johnston, Bahney).
With all the revenue that is generated, ISIS provides salaries that are higher
than those of governmental forces (Shelton, Tracey). As a result, ISIS is
largely composed of low-commitment opportunistic fighters. The short-term, material motivations
of its membership rendered ISIS’s commanders unable to police defection or
indiscipline within their units, abusiveness was an unintended result of a recruitment
strategy that attracted opportunistic joiners first. In addition, IS does not
need the broad population’s support or hard labor for its survival, therefore IS
commanders do not have much incentive to prevent the application of
indiscriminate violence.
Applying Weinstein’s
theory into the case of IS violence shows us that we may not be able to find
the causes of civilian violence by solely looking into IS’s ideology.
Sources
Johnston, Patrick, and Benjamin
Bahney. "Disrupt ISIS's Cash Flows." The New York Times13
Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.
Shelton, Tracey. "No More
Mr. Nice Islamic State." CNBC 19 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug.
2014.
Rukmini, Callimachi. "Before
Killing James Foley, ISIS Demanded Ransom From U.S." The New York
Times 20 Aug. 2014. Web. 21 Aug. 2014.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. Inside
Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2007. Print.
